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DETERMINANTS OF ADOPTION OF SECURITY SYSTEMS TO 
ADDRESS BIOTERRORIST THREATS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DAIRY FARMS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 
Nicolas K. Buttars, Allen J. Young, and DeeVon Bailey 
ABSTRACT 
111 
Data generated from a survey of western dairy farms is used to determine the 
characteristics of dairy farmers who have undertaken to improve security measures on their 
farms during the past two or three years. The findings suggest that decisions to improve on-farm 
security are influenced by the producer's awareness of how to develop a security policy and also 
the size of the dairy operation. The results also support the notion that farms may be vulnerable 
to bioterrorist attacks because most farmers do not believe it is important to establish on-farm 
security policies. 
JEL Classifications: QI0, Q12, Q16 
Key words: on-farm security, bioterrorism, dairy farms 
DETERMINANTS OF ADOPTION OF SECURITY SYSTEMS TO 
ADDRESS BIOTERRORIST THREATS: AN ANALYSIS OF 
DAIRY FARMS IN THE WESTERN UNITED STATES 
After the terrorist attacks of September 11,2001, the United States needed to consider in 
a profound way all its potential vulnerabilities (National Academy of Sciences). One area of 
potential vulnerability that quickly surfaced was the U.S. food supply because, obviously, 
everyone consumes food and because of the importance of the food industry to the U.S. and 
international economy. 
The U.S. food safety inspection system was organized to detect and eradicate 
food safety problems resulting from unintentional contaminations, especially related to 
pathogens (National Academy of Sciences; Bailey). The specter ofbioterrorism (intentional 
contamination) presented an entirely new set of issues for the food industry and government food 
regulators to deal with regarding how to ensure the safety of the U.S. food supply. For example, 
in an instance of bioterrorism the food safety system needs to deal with the fact that the 
perpetrator chooses the time, place, and type of contamination that will occur rather than the 
seemingly random acts associated with unintentional contamination. 
The National Academy of Sciences indicates that, "Technical sophistication would not be 
necessary for attacks [on U.S. agriculture]," and that "Although an attack ... is highly unlikely 
to result in famine or malnutrition, the possible damage includes major direct and indirect costs 
to the agricultural and national economy, adverse public-health effects, loss of public confidence 
in the food system and in public officials, and widespread public concern and confusion." The 
U.S. agriculture/food industry accounts for about $1 trillion annually in economic activity or 
13% of the Unites States' gross domestic product and about 18% of domestic employment 
(Smith; Dyckman). Consequently, a terrorist attack on the U.S. food system would have the 
potential of inflicting a substantial level of human and/or economic damage. 
In testimony to the U.S. Senate, the United States General Accounting Office (GAO) 
suggests that a terrorist attack on the U.S. food system intended to destroy human life would 
likely be directed at finished food products while an attempt to disrupt economic activity would 
probably take the form of an attack on crops or livestock (Dyckman). However, experts 
generally agree that a bioterrorist attack could occur at virtually any level of the food marketing 
chain (Dyckman; National Academy of Sciences). 
Besides its importance as a basic industry, agriculture appears to be vulnerable to attack, 
especially at the farm level, for a number of other reasons. First, there are a relatively large 
number or farms providing a large pool of potential targets. Second, some production 
enterprises, especially livestock, are concentrated in large numbers in certain geographic 
locations making it potentially easy to infect a large number of livestock with relative ease. 
Third, agricultural products tend to move over significant geographical distances to intermediate 
production, processing, and consumption locations making the potential for spreading disease or 
other types of deadly material through natural day-to-day business activities an added threat. 
Finally, many experts suggest that biosecurity measures on farms in the United States are 
woefully inadequate. Smith refers to farming as " ... an exceptionally porous industry from a 
security standpoint." Davis indicates that, "The poor level ofbiosecurity on the majority of 
farms today guarantees unchallenged and unhindered access to the determined, patient terrorist." 
Much of the concern at the farm level about biosecurity is related to the intentional 
spreading of highly contagious animal diseases such as foot-and-mouth disease (Dyckman; 
National Academy of Sciences). But there are also concerns about other contaminants that can 
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cause adverse health effects in humans such as the spread of deadly agents such as anthrax. 
Agents with less deadly consequences but still holding the potential for adverse effects to human 
include the intentional contamination of milk with antibiotics such as was suspected in a few 
cases in New York (Clinton). 
The two components necessary for a successful terrorism act are vulnerability and 
capability (Siegrist) and, unfortunately, U.S. agriculture appears to present both of these 
prerequisites to potential terrorists (Smith; Davis; Dyckman; National Academy of Sciences). 
While bioterrorism could occur at any level of the marketing chain, one could argue that routine 
security measures at processing plants and other points in the chain are better, on the average, 
than at the farm level thus potentially rendering the farm level as the "weak link" in the food 
chain in relationship to bioterrorism. Consequently, this paper examines the attitudes and 
practices of a sample of dairy farmer located in the western United States in relation to the 
potential threat ofbioterrorist attacks. Data for this sample were obtained through a survey 
which ascertained if these farmers view bioterrorism as a threat to their individual farming 
operation and if they have taken any measures to safeguard against possible intentional 
contamination on their farms. 
A number of different crop and livestock enterprises could have been selected for this 
analysis. However, the dairy industry was selected because (1) it has been the target of 
suspected bioterrorist acts before (e.g., Clinton), (2) given the close confinement and relatively 
large size of most dairy herds (say, compared to beef herds), and (3) the fact that milk is 
routinely commingled at the processing plant with milk from other farms, thus potentially 
providing terrorists with the means of inflicting for spreading contamination broadly from a 
single point.. 
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Background and Methodology 
Virtually no published research is available about the economics of establishing security 
on farms against a possible bioterrorist attack. Much of the literature tends to focus on how 
agricultural products can function as a medium for the spread of animal and human diseases 
(e.g., Davis; National Academy of Sciences). In a related fashion, other literature has examined 
public health policy in relation to terrorist attacks and appropriate reactions to such attacks (e.g., 
Avery; McDade; Fidler). Brookmeyer and Blades discuss appropriate modeling procedures for 
the spread of disease resulting from a bioterrorist attacks using the 2001 U.S. anthrax outbreak as 
a backdrop. Educational materials dealing with agroterrorism have been prepared by the U.S. 
government and land-grant universities (EDEN; USDA, FSIS). But, we are unaware of scientific 
studies examining issues and concerns related to preparedness against a bioterrorist attack at the 
individual farm level 
The reason for this lack may be due to a perceived low level of risk that exists for any 
particular farm. But we are aware of no scientific studies examining even basic actions taken by 
farmers as security measures against bioterrorism such as locking milk storage tanks when not in 
use
1 
or monitoring against uninvited persons having access to the farmer's property. 
Consequently, this study offers an initial examination of whether or not very basic types of 
security measures are being undertaken of dairy farms, or if a security plan is even in place on 
these farms. 
A survey was developed and sent by mail to dairy farmers who receive the Utah Dairy 
Newsletter. Table 1 provides statistics for the number of surveys sent, response rate, and 
1 Locking milk tanks is one method suggested as an on-farm risk management practice against intentional 
or unintentional contamination of milk (Reed). 
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information about the representativeness of the sample compared to the population. The sample 
appeared to be quite representative of the population for all states except Idaho where the 
average number of cows per herd for survey respondents was substantially and statistically lower 
than the population mean for herd size (Table 1). The survey data obtained from respondents in 
Idaho represents the lowest percentage of the total cow numbers with only about 1 % being 
represented. The state with the highest percentage of cows represented in data from the survey 
was Nevada with 37% of the total population. The survey data represented 7% of the total 
population of dairy cows in the five states included in the survey. 
Selected survey questions, together with frequencies of responses, and variable names 
associated with the selected survey questions are presented in Table 2. The survey questions 
were developed to determine what actions dairy farmers have taken relative to security measures 
against possible bioterrorist threats. For example questions were asked about potential for 
unauthorized access to the farm (UNNOTICE), milk tank (B ULK), and feeding areas (FEED) and 
how frequently unauthorized persons are found on the farm (UNAUTHP). Questions were also 
asked to determine if the farmer believed that security was important on the dairy (IMPSECUR) 
and if they had made changes in the last 2-3 years to improve security on their farm (SECURITy) 
and if they had a security policy in place (POLICy). Other questions were asked to ascertain 
how many hours per day the production areas on the farm are left unattended (i.e., or, 
conversely, how many hours per day these areas are under direct observation by the farmer) 
(UNATTEND). Finally, the farmer was asked if they had had cases of unintentional and 
intentional contamination on their farm in the past (CONTAM). 
The survey data provide general information about the security situation on the dairy 
farms in this sample. Additional insights might be gained if statistical techniques are used to 
identify the detenninants of why some fanners have undertaken actions to improve security on 
their fanns and some have not. For example, one might ask why some fanners believe security 
measures are important while some do not or why some have actually taken steps to improve 
security on their fanns while others have not. 
In cases where only action or inaction is observable, an index function model may be the 
best method to describe the probability of an action being carried out or not. In this case we 
observe whether or not the survey respondent has actually taken steps to improve security on 
his/her fann during the recent past (2-3 years) (SECURITY). 
Greene (2003) suggests that survey participants will base their response, in this case on 
whether or not respondents have improved security on their fann, on "a marginal benefit-
marginal cost calculation" of the perceived net benefit from improving on-fann security 
compared to not doing so (Greene, p. 668). Greene (2003: p. 669) demonstrates the difference 
between cost and benefit as an unobservable index variable, y*, in the following model: 
(1) y* = x'{J + £ 
where the error tenn, c, is described as an "innocent nonnalization" since its actual variance is 
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. not known. However, if the actual variance were known, a nonnalization of the observed data (y 
and x) would not be changed (Greene, p. 669). The explanatory variables and parameter 
estimates are represented in this model by X and {J, respectively. The model presented by Greene 
(2003: p.669) shows that because the survey measures only whether steps have been taken to 
improve on-fann security or not (SECURITY in Table 2), then the observed choice is 
demonstrated by 
(2) y = I if y* > 0 and y = 0 if y* :s o. 
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Greene (2003: p. 669) states that a constant term must be included in the latent regression if the 
threshold for y* is zero. This is because the marginal cost and benefits are being evaluated 
indirectly through participants' choice to undertake on-farm security improvement 
(SECURITY= 1) or not to do so (SECURITY = 0) (Greene 2003: p. 669). Obviously, SECURITY 
is an imperfect measure of efforts to increase on-farm security measures because it doesn't 
provide detail regarding the level or the quality of measures that the farm operator has 
undertaken to improve security. However, considering that only about 24% of the sample 
(301125 see Table 2 which catalogues the survey questions used to obtain responses, frequency 
of responses, mean responses for the explanatory variables) have undertaken measures to 
increase security on their farms in the last two or three years, and increased understanding of 
why some farmers have taken any steps to improve security, while the majority has not, may be 
important. The following equation shows a model for probability if the distribution of the error 
term is symmetric: 
(3) Prob(y* > 0 I x) = Prob(c < x'{J I x) = F(x '[1). 
For normally distributed disturbances, either a logit or probit model may be used to estimate the 
probabilities according to Greene (2003: p. 670). The variables explaining whether or not the 
farmer has improved security on his/her dairy farm in the past two or three years are given by 
UNATTEND, POLICY, IMPSECUR, EXPER, UNAUTHP, KNOWCOST, CONTAM, and 
MILKING (Table 2). 
If UNATTEND equals one, it indicates that the dairy is left unattended fewer than 12 
hours each day. The a priori expectation is that the fewer hours the dairy is left unattended the 
less need there is to implement added security measures. Consequently, the expected sign for the 
estimated parameter for UNATTEND in a regression analysis is negative. If the dairy operator 
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has a security polity in place, one would expect that efforts are more likely to have been made to 
improve security on the farm in the last few years. Consequently, POLICY's expected sign for 
its estimated parameter is positive. If the farmer professes to believe that security measures 
against bioterrorism are important (IMSECUR), then one would expect a higher likelihood that 
the farmer has taken measures to improve security on his/her farm and the expected sign of the 
parameter estimate for IMSECUR is positive. The effect of experience (EXPER) on whether or 
not a dairy operator has increased security in the past few years is uncertain because the threat of 
bioterrorism is relatively new. Consequently, it is uncertain how the level of experience might 
affect the decision to increase on-farm security measures because likely all of the dairy farmers 
in the sample have had the same amount of experience with the specter ofbioterrorism because it 
IS so new. 
If unauthorized persons are frequently found on the farm (UNAUTHP) one would expect 
that the farmer's level of concern about intentional contamination would be heightened. 
Consequently, the a priori sign for UNA UTHP' s parameter estimate is positive. If the farmer 
has an idea of how much security improvements would cost (KNOWCOS1), he or she must have 
at least thought about and probably made an effort to obtain these. Also, if he/she has been the 
victim of either intentional or unintentional contamination before (CONTAM) one would expect 
the farmer to be more sensitive of the potential threat of intentional contamination. For these 
reasons, the expected signs for the parameter estimates for KNOWCOSTand CONTAM are both 
positive. Finally, the size of the milking herd (MILKING) likely increases the expected costs of a 
bioterrorist threat because a single act of intentional contamination potentially affects more 
animals and/or product. This suggests the probability of a bioterrorist attack may be greater for 
larger dairies and that the cost of such an attack would be greater for larger dairies than for 
smaller dairies. Consequently, one would expect the sign for the parameter estimate for 
MILKING to be positive. 
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Taken as a whole, the results will provide an initial measure of on-farm preparedness for 
dairy farms in this geographic region relating to bioterrorism. This is based on the 
representativeness of most of the sample (four out of five states) and the information provided by 
the survey and statistical analysis. This information should be helpful in gauging the need to 
improve awareness and therefore providing a backdrop for educational programs for dairy 
farmers in this region about bioterrorist threats. 
Results 
The frequencies and means of survey responses reported in Table 2 provided basic 
information on farmers' characteristics, their attitudes about biosecurity issues, and whether or 
not they have recently improved security on their farms. The farmers that were surveyed are 
experienced with most having at least 16 years of experience as dairy farmers and almost half 
having more than 25 years of experience (EXPER in Table 2). Most of the dairies are left 
unattended fewer than eight hours per day (UNATTEND) and 62% (78 out of 126) left 
unattended fewer than five hours per day. This suggests a high level of direct observation of the 
operation by the farmer or employees and indicates that the window of opportunity for an 
external (non-employee) bioterrorist to conduct operations undetected is limited to a few hours 
each day, probably at night. Only 220/0 of operations have a security policy in place (POLICy). 
This was a surprisingly low number, but may indicate that limited discussion and information 
about developing a plan has been provided to these farmers. Most of the farmers (almost 68%) 
either strongly agree or agree that it would be possible for an uninvited visitor to enter the farm 
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unnoticed (UNNOTICE). This suggests that most of these fanners believe that an external 
bioterrorist could slip unnoticed onto their fanns. The majority of respondents also believe that 
it would be possible to gain unauthorized access to the bulk tank (B ULK) and feeding areas 
(FEED) on his/her fann. 2 Also, the milk storage tank is left unlocked on almost all of the fanns 
surveyed (LOCKLID). 
About half of respondents (46.8%) indicate that they either strongly agree or agree that 
security measures would be important on their fann (IMPSECUR). But about 35% of the 
respondents (44 out of 126) are unsure whether or not the need for security measures on their 
fann is important. Only 18% of respondents (23 out of 126) are quite certain that security 
measures on their fann are unimportant (respondent either disagrees or strongly disagrees with 
IMPSECUR in Table 2). Only about 14% of respondents believed they knew how much it would 
cost to increase fann storage security for raw milk (KNOWCOST). Interestingly, over 22% of 
the respondents had experienced a problem with unintentional or intentional contamination 
(CONTAM). While almost all of these cases were unintentional contamination, two respondents 
reported they had experienced intentional contamination. This suggests that even if security 
measures are not directed toward external bioterrorists, that intentional contamination by 
employees or fonner employees is a potential threat that may need to be considered. 
The survey results appear to confinn other assessments (e.g., National Academy of 
Sciences; Davis) that there may be relatively easy opportunities for bioterrorists to attack the 
food system at the fann level. The level of concern and level of preparedness appears to be 
mixed on these dairy fanns, but leans toward unconcern and not being prepared. Obviously, this 
relates to the individual risk assessments each fanner makes about the threat of an attack on 
2 Obviously, an unauthorized person would need to enter the farm to gain access to the milk tank or the 
feeding areas. These questions, BULK and FEED were asked to ascertain if particular areas of the farm were more 
vulnerable than others. 
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hislher individual fann. However, at the least the results suggest the need for additional 
infonnation about potential threats and possible security measures that fanners could undertake 
that might counteract these threats at least to some degree. Costs of implementing security 
measures are likely a major consideration for these fanners and more infonnation about specific 
security weaknesses and costs to address to develop protocols and systems to begin to address 
those weaknesses need to be researched. 
The parameter estimates and marginal effects for the binomiallogit analysis for 
respondent characteristics contributing to the decision to implement new or added security or not 
are reported in Table 3. The results suggest that the fanners most likely to have implemented 
improved security on their fanns are those with a security policy in place (POLICy) , know the 
costs for implementing improved security (KNOWCOS1), and who have large dairies 
(MILKING). One might expect there to be a correlation between having recently completed 
security improvements and knowing the costs for doing so (KNOWCOS1). 3 So, perhaps the two 
characteristics identified by the analysis presented in Table 3 that might offer new insights about 
the decision to improve security or not are POLICY and MILKING. POLICY is probably 
affected by the level of infonnation a producer has about security systems and protocols and 
suggests that education about how to develop these policies would aid in the implementation of 
added security measures on dairy fanns. However, the results also seem to suggest that the size 
of the operation is a very important detenninant regarding recent decisions to improve security. 
This makes sense because there are probably economies of size associated with security 
improvements which would decrease the per-unit cost of these improvements on large dairies 
compared to smaller dairies. For example, the marginal effect for MILKING suggests that a 
3The marginal effect for KNOWCOST indicates that a dairy operator that knew the costs for additional 
security was a little more than 21 % more likely to have implemented recent security improvements than an operator 
that did not know these costs. 
dairy with 1,100 cows would have an added probability of 40% of having recently completed 
security improvements compared to a dairy with just 100 cows. 
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In connection with the analysis presented in Table 3, a second logit model was estimated 
to determine the characteristics of respondents that believe security measures on dairy farms are 
important compared to those who do not (IMPSECUR). The results of this second analysis are 
presented in Table 4 and suggest that farmers with less experience (EXPER), who have a security 
policy for their farm (POLICy), and who have had frequent problems with unauthorized people 
on their farm (UNA UTHP) are the respondents most likely to believe that security measures are 
important. The models in Tables 3 and 4 tend do not predict responses of"1" extremely well, 
but appear· to do a reasonable job of predicting "0." This suggests other unknown variables not 
captured by the survey responses contribute to the decision to implement increased security 
measures, but we are uncertain what these other variables might be. 
In general, the results support the notion that farms (in this case dairies) could be 
vulnerable to a bioterrorist attack because most farmers do not believe it is important to do so, 
are not engaged in establishing security policies, and have not taken steps to improve security on 
their farms. Larger dairies are more likely to have implemented improved security. This is a 
positive result if one believes that the greatest threat is to large farms. The results indicate that 
many farmers are ambivalent about increased security measures on the farms. This may reflect 
that many farmers perceive a very small risk to their individual operation and are willing to bear 
that risk. Educational efforts, such as extension programming, will need to recognize that many 
farmers, especially those with small or mid-sized operations, may be unwilling to spend 
significant amounts of money to upgrade their security practices. Consequently, educational 
efforts for these operators may with to focus on low-cost, and perhaps, partial solutions to 
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improving on-farm security. However, larger farm operators may be willing to consider more 
sophisticated and costly security upgrades. 
Conclusions 
The U.S. food and agriculture system is considered vulnerable to bioterrorist attacks. 
This study examined survey data from dairy farmers in the western United States to determine if 
these farmers had made recent improvements in their on-farm security systems. The findings 
indicate that most of the dairy farmers surveyed had not made any recent security improvements 
and that most do not believe that they need to. For example, farmers with a large amount of 
experience (older) do not believe that improving security measures are important. Farmers with 
larger operations are more likely to have made recent security improvements than farmers with 
smaller operations. Having an on-farm security policy appeared to be an indicator of whether or 
not a farmers had made recent security improvements and also if they believed that improving 
security was important. 
The results suggest that, if the government believes that security education is important 
for farmers, different approaches to education about on-farm security will probably need to be 
taken with smaller and larger farmers. Educational efforts should probably focus on the potential 
risks from bioterrorists and disgruntled employees farmers face and should also focus on 
developing a security policy for the farm. 
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Table 1. Survey and Population Statistics for Dairy Farmers for Selected States in the Western United States 
State Total Dairy Surveys Surveys Response Cows in 
Herds Sent Returned Rate (%) Sample 
Utaha 360 268 77 29% 19,943 
Montanab 110 98 16 16% 2,416 
Idahoc 755 84 22 26% 4,114 
Nevadad 35 35 9 26% 9,702 
Wyominge 30 15 2 13% 282 
* Statistically different from the state mean herd size at the 1 % level of confidence. 
a Source: 2004 Utah Agricultural Statistics. 
b Source: 2004 Montana Agricultural Statistics. 
c Source: 2004 Idaho Agricultural Statistics. 
d Source: 2004 Nevada Agricultural Statistics. 
e Source: 2004 Wyoming Agricultural Statistics. 
Total Dairy Mean Herd 
Cows in State Size Sample 
91,000 259 
18,000 151 
404,000 187* 
26,000 1,087 
3,800 141 
16 
Mean Herd 
Size State 
253 
164 
535 
867 
109 
17 
Table 2. Survey Questions, Frequencies, Mean Responses to Survey Questions, and Variable 
Names and Values 
Mean Variable Name 
Question Responses=Code Frequencies Response and Value 
How many dairy cows Continuous variable 250 MILKING 
are you currently 
milking? 
How many years have < 5=1 4 
you been directly involved 6-15=2 26 
in the dairy industry? 16-25=3 31 3.48 EXPER=1 ife>2, 
26-35=4 36 code>2,0 
36+=5 30 otherwise 
How many hours per day is < 5=1 78 
the dairy is left unattended? 6-8=2 29 
9-11 =3 14 1.58 UNATTEND=1 if 
12-14=4 4 code<3, 0 
15+=5 otherwise 
Do you have a security Yes=1 28 
policy in place? No=2 99 1.78 POLICY=1 if 
Don't know=3 
° 
code=l, ° 
otherwise 
It would be possible for a Stronglyagree=1 18 
visitor to enter the farm Agree=2 68 
unnoticed. Unsure=3 13 2.44 UNNOTICE=1 if 
Disagree=4 23 code<3, 0 
Strongly disagree=5 5 otherwise 
If would be possible for a Stronglyagree=1 19 
visitor or an unauthorized Agree=2 73 
employee to enter the Unsure=3 11 2.35 BULK=1 if 
bulk tank milk storage Disagree=4 19 code<3,0 
area unnoticed. Strongly disagree=5 5 otherwise 
It would be possible for a Stronglyagree=1 25 
visitor to enter the feed Agree=2 74 
storage area unnoticed. Unsure=3 12 2.18 FEED=1 if 
Disagree=4 12 code<3, 0 
Strongly disagree=5 4 otherwise 
Unauthorized people are Very frequently= 1 3 
found on the farm. Frequently=2 6 
Sometimes=3 25 3.75 UNAUTHP=I, if 
Rarely=4 79 code<3,0 
Never=5 14 otherwise 
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Table 2. (Continued) 
Mean Variable Name 
Question Responses=Code Frequencies Response and Value 
The milk storage tank is Always=1 2 
locked when the parlor is not Frequently=2 2 
in operation. Sometimes=3 0 4.83 LOCKLID= 1, if 
Rare1y=4 4 code<3, 0 
Never=5 116 otherwise 
Do you consider the need Stronglyagree=1 9 
for security measures on Agree=2 50 
your farm important? Unsure=3 44 2.71 IMPSECUR=I, if 
Disagree=4 15 code<3,0 
Strongly disagree=5 8 otherwise 
What would be an Don't know=1 111 1.12 KNOWCOST=I , if 
approximation of total Know=2 18 code=2, 0 
costs to increase farm otherwisea 
storage security for raw milk? 
Have you increased security Yes=1 30 1.76 SECURITY=I , if 
on your dairy in the last No=2 95 code=I,O 
2-3 years? otherwise 
Have you ever had a Yes=1 28b 1.78 CONTAM=l , if 
problem with intentional or No=2 98 code=l,O 
unintentional contamination otherwise 
on your farm? 
a Estimates of costs vary from a few dollars to many thousands of dollars and were also based on inconsistent 
assessments of needs (e.g., a simple lock on the storage tank to closed-circuit television surveillance). Consequently, 
KNO WCOST is used simply as a proxy to establish if the respondent had considered costs to improve surveillance or 
not. 
b Of these responds, two indicated that there had been cases of intentional contamination on their farm. 
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Table 3. Logit Analysis Results Determining Characteristics of Respondent Farmers Who Have 
Improved Security on Their Farms in the Recent Past (Dependent Variable = 
SECURITy) 
Independent Parameter 
Variable Estimatea Marginal Effect 
Intercept -3.585** -0.596** 
(l.102) (0.161) 
UNATTEND 0.875 0.145 
(0.900) (0.146) 
POLICY 0.808b 0.134b 
(0.607) (0.101) 
IMPSECUR 0.317 0.053 
(0.526) 0.087) 
EXPER 0.078 0.129 
(0.646) (0.107) 
UNAUTHP 0.459 0.076 
(0.600) (0.099) 
KNOWCOST 1.289* 0.214* 
(0.683) (0.113) 
CONTAM 0.120 0.020 
(0.586) (0.097) 
MILKING 0.003** 0.0004** 
(0.001) (0.0002) 
Predictions: 
Predicted 
Actual 
---.!2 ~ Total 
0 87 4 91 
1 ~ 10 ~ 
Total 106 14 120 
*Statistically different than zero at the 10% level of significance for a two-tailed test. 
**Statistically different than zero at the 5% level of significance for a two-tailed test. 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. 
b Statistically different than zero at the 10% level of significance for a one-tailed test of the hypothesis 
that the parameter estimate is positive. 
Table 4. Logit Analysis Results Determining Characteristics of Respondent Farmers Who 
Believe that On-Farm Security Measures Are Important (Dependent Variable = IMPSECUR) 
Independent Parameter 
Variable Estimatea Marginal Effect 
Intercept -0.073 -0.018 
(0.706) (0.176) 
UNATTEND -0.173 -0.043 
(0.584) (0.146) 
POLICY 1.277** 0.318** 
(0.621) (0.155) 
SECURITY 0.306 0.076 
(0.519) (0.129) 
EXPER -1.424*** -0.355*** 
(0.526) (0.131) 
UNAUTHP 0.969** 0.242** 
(0.488) (0.121) 
KNOWCOST 0.220 0.055 
(0.683) (0.170) 
CONTAM 0.046 0.012 
(0.510) (0.127) 
MILKING 0.0007 0.0002 
(0.001) (0.0002) 
Predictions: 
Predicted 
Actual J2 1 Total 
0 51 13 64 
1 11 25 56 
Total 82 38 120 
* Statistically different than zero at the 10% level of significance for a two-tailed test. 
** Statistically different than zero at the 5% level of significance for a two-tailed test. 
***Statistically different than zero at the 1% level of significance for a two-tailed test. 
a Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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